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Wade: Parking in the Handicapped Zone: The Supreme Court's Attack again

PARKING IN THE HANDICAPPED ZONE: THE
SUPREME COURT'S ATTACK AGAINST THE ADA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) is undoubtedly the most
significant advancement for the protection of disabled Americans' civil rights.2
Congress' first finding in the preamble to the ADA is that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older."3 Throughout history,4
"society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,' and
despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 6 The continued
discrimination suffered by this class of people permeates all realms of society,7 and
disabled individuals continue to encounter discrimination in every conceivable
form.8 A major effect of these discriminatory practices is that "people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally."
Despite the highly commendable and landmark legislative attempt to protect
the civil rights of disabled individuals, the ADA's inherent ambiguity has
undermined its essential purpose. The fundamental purpose of the ADA is "to

1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. For an overview of the ADA, see Nancy Lee Jones, Overview andEssentialRequirementsofTheAmericans
With DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471 (1991); Harvey S. Mars, An Overview of Title I of The Americans
With DisabilitiesAct and its Impact Upon FederalLabor Law, 12 HoFSTRA LAB. L.J. 251 (1995). See generally,
e.g., Lisa, Eichhom, MajorLitigationActivities RegardingMajorLife Activities: The Failureof the "Disability"
Definition in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405 (1999).

3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
4. Disability discrimination has existed throughout time. "And as Jesus passed by, he saw a man which was
blind from his birth. And his disciples asked him, Master, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born
blind?" John 9:1-2 (King James).
5. See, e.g., TERRY F. PETrOHN, PSYCHOLOGY: A CONNECTExT (4th ed. 1998) (discussing 17"' Century
approaches of treating the mentally ill and psychologically disturbed by imprisoning them in iron chains and using
methods of torture and perpetual isolation to keep their evil impurities away from the rest of society).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
7. Congress found that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.... Id. § 12101(a)(3) (emphasis added).
8. Congress found that:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination including outright
intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and
practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser

services, programs, activities, benefits,jobs, or other opportunities...
Id. § 12101(a)(5) (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 12101(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities .... ."' In the context of
employment discrimination, the thrust ofthis purpose is "to protect individuals who
have an underlying medical condition or other limiting impairment, but who are
capable of doing the job, with or without the help of medications, prosthetic
devices, or other ameliorative measures,
and with or without a reasonable
11
accommodation by the employer."
One aspect of recent contention engendered by the ADA's inherent ambiguity
has centered around whether the effects of measures taken to correct for, or
mitigate, an individual's impairment must be taken into consideration when
determining whether that individual is substantiallylimited in a major life activity
within the meaning of the ADA. In June of 1999, the United States Supreme Court
handed down three decisions interpreting the ADA in the context of mitigating
measures. 2 In sum, the Supreme Court mandated that the effects of mitigating
measures must be taken into consideration when determining whether an individual
is substantially limited in a major life activity, and hence, disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. 3
The Supreme Court's interpretation and construction of the ADA in these
decisions significantly abridged and narrowed the scope of protection afforded to
individuals whom the ADA was intended and designed to protect. The interpretative rulings handed down by the Supreme Court in these cases contradict a massive
amount of persuasive authority. Such authority ranges from Congressional
Reports 4 and Executive Agencies' regulations, interpretations, and guidelines 5 to
the prior decisions of the Supreme Court itself, 6 as well as decisions from eight of
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 not to mention amicus curiae briefs 8 from highly
distinguished organizations and individuals. Furthermore, the rulings by the
Supreme Court are, arguably, in direct conflict with the explicit language of the

10. Id. § 12101(b)(1). Other purposes of the ADA enunciated by Congress are:
[r"o provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities; ... to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and... to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to
regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people
with disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b)(2)-(4).
11. Arnold v. United ParcelServ., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,861 (1"Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994)
as authority from which this proposition in derived).

12. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (stating that corrective lenses for severely
myopic twin sisters must be considered in determining whether sisters were disabled under the ADA); Albertson's,

Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999) (stating that individual with monocular vision is not covered under
ADA because of ameliorative effects of mitigating measures); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999) (stating that ameliorative effects of medication on employee's high blood pressure took him out of ADA
coverage).
13. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at2146;Albertson's,119 S. Ct. at 2169; Murphy,119 S. Ct. at 2135.
14. See discussion infra Part VILA.
15. See discussion infra Part VILB.
16. See School Bd. of Nassau County. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
17. See discussion infra Part IX.A.
18. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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ADA. In light of these authorities, the rulings by the United States Supreme Court
incorrectly interpreted and construed the ADA in the context of mitigating
measures.
The ADA covers a plethora of situations where discrimination can occur.1 9
The primary focus of this Comment is on the ADA's definition of disability and the
question of who is disabled within the meaning of the ADA in the context of
employment discrimination, which is the same focus that the three United States
Supreme Court cases involved.20
II. THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY: THE THREE PRONGS
There are three different circumstances (prongs) under which an individual
can be considered to have a disability21 within the meaning of the ADA. Under the
firstprong, the ADA defines disability to mean "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual."22
The secondprong extends the status of disabilityto individuals who have "a record
of such an impairment."' This provision protects individuals "who have recovered
from a physical or mental impairment which previously substantially limited them
... in a major life activity."24 The third prong affords disability status to those
individuals who are "regarded as having such an impairment." This provision
protects an individual "who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment or has no physical or mental impairment but is treated by a covered
entity as having such an impairment."2' 6 These three prongs are not mutually
exclusive, discrete categories.27 Rather, the definitions constitute overlapping
categories "aimed at ensuring that individuals who now have, or ever had, a
substantially limiting impairment are covered by the Act." 28
Within this statutory scheme, there are numerous words and phrases that are
ambiguous. The statute does not define physical or mental impairment,substantially limits, or major life activity, all of which are subject to a wide variety of
reasonable interpretations.29

19. The ADA covers discrimination in employment, housing, transportation, and access to public and private
buildings, program, and services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
20. See generally Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2139; Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2162; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2133.
21. The ADA defines disability to mean "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of an individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
22. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
23. Id. § 12102(2)B).
24. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
26. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
27. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. All of the United States Courts of Appeals have considered this issue in one form or another, and the
incongruity of these opinions and rulings provide an excellent illustration of the reasonable person's ability to
interpret the statutory language as having different meanings. CompareBartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
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III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

Before proceeding to the discussion of the meaning of these words and phrases
within the ADA's definition of disability, it is necessary to briefly mention some
fundamental principles of statutory construction, interpretation, and implementation, both in general and in regard to the ADA.
A. The ChevronDoctrine
The Supreme Court has examined the issue of statutory construction on
several occasions. Much of the wisdom and precedent passed down by the Court
in regard to statutory construction is synthesized in what has become known as the
Chevron doctrine.3" Under the Chevron doctrine, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency charged with interpreting the statute has provided a permissible
construction of the statute.31 "The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissible could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even [that it is] the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."32
An administrative agency's power to interpret and administer a congressionally created statute inherently includes the ability to formulate policy and construct
rules and guidelines to clarify ambiguities left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.33 The Chevron doctrine acknowledges that an administrative agency
necessarily requires the ability to formulate policy and fill in gaps left by
Congress.34 When Congress has left such a gap, in the form of an ambiguity for
instance, then "there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate

Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149
F.3d 626, 629 (7"' Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (11 Cir. 1998); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933,937 (3d Cir. 1997); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,
765 (6' Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8h Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 693 (1998);
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521 (11t' Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362,
366 (9"' Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1162 (1997) (all holding that mitigating measures must not be
considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity and, hence,
disabled within the meaning of the ADA), and Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464,47071 (5' Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S.Ct. 2388 (holding that whether mitigating measures should be taken into
consideration should be determined on a case-by-case basis, with consideration given to the nature and seriousness
of the impairment and types of mitigating measures available), with Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d
187, 191 (5' Cir. 1996); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("If an
insulin-dependent diabetic can control her condition with the use of insulin... she cannot argue that her life is
substantially limited by her condition."); Murphyv. UnitedParcel Serv. Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,881 (D. Kan. 1996)
(holding that mitigating measures must be considered when determining if an individual is substantially limited
and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
30. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (dealing
factually with the Environmental Protection Agency's construction of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
31. Seeid at843.
32. Id. at 843, n. 11 (citations omitted).
33. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
34. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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a specific provision of the statute by regulation. 35 "Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute."36
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the ADA
Congress authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to issue regulations to carry out the ADA' s statutory mandates.37 Pursuant
to such authority, the EEOC has promulgated regulations to govern industry in the
employment of disabled persons. To clarify the broad and ambiguous language of
the ADA, the EEOC has issued several regulatory provisions clarifying the
language of the ADA.38 For further guidance, Interpretive Guidelines are attached
as an appendix to these regulations. 39 The EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines
constitute a set of interpretive rules and are, therefore, not binding law.4"
Contrasted with legislative regulations, which carry the force of law, non-regulatory
interpretations such as the Interpretive Guidelines, receive a lesser, but still some
degree of judicial deference "as long as it is a permissible construction of the
statute."4 1 The Supreme Court has found that "such administrative interpretations
of the [ADA] by the enforcing agency, 'while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. '42
IV. CLARIFICATION OF ADA BY THE

EEOC

The Interpretive Guidelines promulgated by the EEOC,4 3 pursuant to the
authority granted to it by Congress, have served to clarify the broad and ambiguous
language of the ADA. The following background information will be helpful in
adequately understanding the subsequent discussion of mitigating measures.
A. Physical and Mental Impairment
The EEOC defines aphysicalimpairmentas "[a]ny physiological disorder, or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting.. ." a wide array

35. Id. at 843-44.

36. Id. at 844 (citations omitted).
37. 42U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
38. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999) (Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
39. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (1999) (Appendix to Part 1630 - Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
40. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,766 (61 Cir. 1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
41. Arnold v. UPS, 136 F.3d at 864.

42. Gilday 124 F.3d at 766 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). See Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2155 (1999) ("at the very least, these interpretations 'constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which [we] may properly resort' for additional guidance." (alterations in
original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1994)). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,642
(1998); Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864.
43. See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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of body parts or systems."' The EEOC defines mental impairmentas "[a]ny mental

or psychological disorder45 such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 6 Additionally, the
EEOC states that "the existence of an impairment is to be determined without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices."'4 7

The EEOC does not attempt the impossible task of categorically defining
specific illnesses, diseases, and afflictions that would indisputably be covered by
the ADA.4" However, the legislative history does elucidate a list of specific
illnesses, diseases, and afflictions. For instance, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources4 9 stated that the phrase physical or mental impairment
includes, but is not limited to, the following examples: "orthopedic, visual, speech,
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple

sclerosis.. . [EHIV], cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism."5
B. SubstantiallyLimited
The EEOC has determined that an individual is substantiallylimited51 because
of a disability in the following situations:
[If the individual is] (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity. 2

44. According to the EEOC, physical impairment means: "Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine..." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1999).
45. A psychological disorder can be defined as "a pattern of behavioral or psychological symptoms that causes
persons significant distress, impairs the [individual's] ability to function in one or more important areas of life, or
both." AMmPlcAN PSYCHATRiC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS:
Dsm-IV 13 (4t' ed. 1994).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1999).
47. Id.
The EEOC goes on to exemplify this point, which will be addressed in considerable detail in subsequent
sections, by stating that an individual with epilepsy would be considered to have an impairment without regard to
any medications taken by the individual.
48. Id.
49. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
50. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) (emphasis added). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(l)(A)(ii) (1999)
(Department of Justice has adopted this list in its regulations applicable to all services, programs, and activities
provided or made available by governmental entities).
51. The EEOC states several "factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is
substantiallylimited in a major life activity: the nature and severity of the impairment; the duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of or resulting from the impairment."
29 C.F.R. § 1620.20)(2) (1999) (emphasis added).
52. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
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Although this definition can be interpreted to indicate that a mere difference could
satisfy the substantiallylimited requirement, inAlbertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,the
United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this determination by the Ninth
Circuit, stating that the legislative purpose of the ADA would be thwarted by such
a construction.53
C. Major Life Activities
The EEOC has determined that major life activities include "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."' There is some question as to whether working
should be considered a major life activity.5 It is undisputed that "[w]hen the major

life activity under consideration is ... working,... 'substantially limits' requires,

at a minimum, that [the individual be] unable to work in a broad class of jobs."56

This does not mean that an individual must be completely unable to work. 7
However, an individual does not qualify as unable to work in a broad class of jobs
when she or he is capable of using personal skills in some form of employment, or
if there is a variety of available jobs in which the individual can work.5 8 The EEOC
was cautious about unequivocally including working as a major life activity and
promulgated a separate definition for the major life activity of working, as follows:
With respect to the major life activity of working[, t]he term substantially limits
means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range ofjobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single,
particularjob does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.5 9

53. Id. at 2164 (stating that "[b]y transforming 'significant restriction' into 'difference,' the [Ninth Circuit]
undercut the fundamental statutory requirement that only impairments that substantially limit [an individual's]
ability to perform a major life activity constitute disabilities.").
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999) (emphasis added).
55. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999) (stating that defining majorlife activitiesto
encompass working "seems 'to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an
impairment, from working with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're
asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap."' (alterations in original) (quoting Tr. of Oral
Argument in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, O.T. 1986, No. 85-1277, p. 15 (argument of Solicitor
General))).
56. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
57. See id. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999) (stating that "an individual does not have to
be totally unable to work in order to be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working.").
58. See Sutton at 2151.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999). Additionally, the EEOC identified three factors that should be
considered when determining whether an individual is substantiallylimited in the major life activity of working:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; (B) [t]hejob from which the
individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types ofjobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual
is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or (C) [t]he job from which the
individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not
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D. The ADA's ProhibitionAgainst Discrimination
Under the ADA, a covered entity is prohibited from discriminating" against
a qualified individual' with a disability" because of the disability of such
individual.' "[A] plaintiff claiming a cause of action under the ADA bears the
burden of proving... that he is a qualified individual."' The ADA defines the
phrase qualifiedindividualwith a disabilityto mean "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."66 The
ADA explicitly grants at least some deference to the employer's judgment as to
what functions of a job are essential, and further states that "if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this
description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
67

job.

utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the
individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)-(C).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) ("The term covered entity means an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, orjoint labor-management committee.").
61. The term discriminate, in the context of employment, includes:
(1) [L]imiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
employee; (2) participating in a contractual... arrangement or relationship that has the effect of
subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination
prohibited by the title (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency,
labor union ... ); (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect
of discrimination on the basis of disability; or (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are
subject to common administrative control; (4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits
to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a relationship or association; (5) (A) not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee...; or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job
applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based
on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant; (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity;
and (7) falling to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to
ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that
impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills [and] aptitude
... of such applicant or employee... rather than reflecting... [the disability].
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(7) (1994).
62. A qualifiedindividualwith a disability is identified as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires." See id. § 12111(8).
63. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (definition of
disability in the ADA).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
65. Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2175 (1999).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (emphasis added).
67. Id. See also Albertson's, 119 S.Ct. at 2175.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol35/iss3/13

8

Wade: Parking in the Handicapped Zone: The Supreme Court's Attack again

20001

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

1. Qualification Standards
The ADA allows employers to establish qualificationstandardsthat result in
excluding an individual with a disability.6" However, "such standards [must be]
job-related and consistent with business necessity."69 Moreover, there can be no
reasonable accommodations available for the employer to undertake to assist the
disabled individual in satisfying the standard.70 The EEOC's regulations implementing Title I define qualification standards to mean "the personal and professional attributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety
and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an
individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired."'
a. Direct Threat
One type of qualification standard that an employer may mandate is "a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a directthreatto the health or safety
of other individuals in the workplace." 72 Direct threat is defined by the ADA as "a
significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation."73 The ADA's direct threat "criterion ordinarily
requires 'an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job,' 'based on medical or other objective
evidence' ....

4"'The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines to Title I of the ADA require

that safety-related standards imposed by employers be evaluated under the ADA's
direct threat standard.75
b. Federal Laws or Regulations
The ADA also allows an employer to establish a qualification standard that is

68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (1999). See also Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2170, n.4
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 12111(3). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1999) (EEOC stating that "[d]irect [tihreat means a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or
reduced by reasonable accommodations.").
74. Albertson'sat2170(quoting 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r);Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624,649 (1998)) (citations
omitted). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1999) (EEOC stating that individualized assessment of an individual's
present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job "shall be based on reasonable medical judgment
that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective means.").
75. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., §§1630.15(b)-(c) (1999) (EEOC specifically stating that safety requirements
that screen out individuals with disabilities must come under the scrutiny of the direct threat standard in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r)).
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"required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation. 7 6 "When Congress
enacted the ADA, it recognized that federal safety rules would limit application of
the ADA as a matter of law."77 Both houses of Congress addressed this matter
within their respective reports:
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report on the ADA stated
that "a person with a disability applying for or currently holding ajob subject to
[DOT standards for drivers] must be able to satisfy these physical qualification
standards in order to be considered a qualified individual with a disability under
title I of this legislation." The two primary House Committees shared this
understanding.78

V. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
As previously mentioned,79 in June of 1999 the United States Supreme Court
handed down three decisions interpreting the scope of the ADA.8" The Supreme
Court's focus was on mitigating measures and the question of who is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA. Brief factual and procedural descriptions of these
cases follow.
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc." t
The plaintiffs in Sutton were twin sisters who both suffered from severe
myopia." Their respective visions, in an uncorrected state, were so bad that they
could not see well enough to perform basic life tasks such as driving or partake in
simple pastime activities such as watching television and shopping." However,
with glasses, each sister had 20/20 vision or better. Both sisters applied at United
Air Lines forjobs as commercial airline pilots. They both met all Federal Aviation
Administration requirements except the requirement that they have uncorrected
visual acuity of 20/100 or better.' Consequently, both sisters were told that they
could not fly commercial aircraft. After receiving right to sue letters from the
EEOC, the sisters brought an action against United Air Lines alleging that it
discriminated against each of them based on their disabilities, in violation of the

76. Albertson's, 19 S. Ct. at 2171."Ihe implementing regulations frtie I also recognize a defense to liability
under the ADA that 'a challenged action is required or necessitated by anotherFederal law or regulation."' (quoting
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.15(e)). Id. at 2171, n.15.

77. Id. at 2172.
78. Id. at 2172-73 (quoting S.REP. No. 101-116, at 27-28 (1998)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

The House Reports referred to are H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 57 (1990) (House Education and Labor
Committee Report); idt at pt. 3, at 34 (House Judiciary Committee Report).
79. See cases cited supranote 12.
80. Id.
81. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
82. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2143.
83. See id
84. See id
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ADA, or, in the alternative, that United Air Lines had discriminated against them
because it regarded them as having a disability, in violation of the ADA.85
The case originated in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, which dismissed the claims.86 The sisters then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's
decisionY The Tenth Circuit held that although the sister's vision in an uncorrected state did render them disabled within the meaning of the ADA, such
disability determination must be considered with regard to measures utilized by the
individual to mitigate the effects of the disability.88 Therefore, the court found that
the sisters were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA when their respective
visions were evaluated in a corrected state.89 The sisters then appealed their cause
to the United States Supreme Court, which in a seven-member majority opinion,
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer,
delivered a sharp and persuasive dissenting opinion in which he completely
disagreed with the majority's construction and interpretation of the ADA
concerning the issue of mitigating measures.9"
B. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 9 t
The plaintiff in Albertson's applied for a job as truck driver for defendant
Albertson's Inc., a grocery-store chain? 2 Kirkingburg had "amblyopia, an
uncorrectable condition that [left] him with 20/200 vision in his left eye and
monocular vision in effect."9" Kirkingburg was initially erroneously certified as
meeting the Department of Transportation's visual acuity requirements; however,
his visual problems were discovered upon retesting after a leave of absence from
work. Thereafter, Albertson's refused to rehire him because of his visual
impairment. 94
Kirkingburg brought suit against Albertson's in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon. The District Court entered summary judgment for
Albertson's, stating that Kirkingburg was not an otherwise qualified truck driver
capable of performing thejob without an accommodation because he could not meet
the Department of Transportation's visual acuity requirements.9 5 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that Kirkingburg was
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing and, hence, disabled within
the meaning of the ADA, and that Albertson's had discriminated against
Kirkingburg because he had obtained a waiver of Department of Transportation
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id. at 2144.
th
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10
Cir. 1997), aft'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
See id.
at 893.
See id. at 906.
See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152-62 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
See iaat 2165.
Id. at 2165-66.
See id. at 2166.
See id.
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Regulations.96 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling
that Kirkingburg was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because his brain
had developed the ability to compensate for the lack of vision in his left eye.97 This
compensating ability of Kirkingburg's brain was held to constitute a mitigating
measure that ameliorated the effects of his vision impairment. 9 Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer joined parts I and m of the opinion." Part II of the opinion dealt
with mitigating measures."
C. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.'
The plaintiff in Murphy had been fired from his job as a United Parcel Service
("UPS") mechanic because an essential function of his job was driving commercial
motor vehicles. 2 The reason for his termination was that he suffered from
hypertension (high blood pressure). 3 Department of Transportation regulations
prohibited an individual from driving "'a commercial motor vehicle' [in interstate
commerce when that individual has been clinically diagnosed with] 'high blood
pressure [that is] likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial
motor vehicle safely. ' ' '1 '4 With the exception of Mr. Murphy's blood pressure in
an unmedicated state, he was completely qualified for the job. 5
Murphy brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, which granted summary judgment for UPS.t 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed in an unpublished opinion." 7 The action
was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court which held, again in a sevenJustice majority, that Murphy was not substantially limited in a major life activity
and, hence, not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because his high blood
pressure medication ameliorated the effects of his hypertension.0 As in Sutton,
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer dissented, stating that an individual should be
evaluated in an unmitigated state to determine if she/he is substantially limited in
a major life activity and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA."9

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Kirkingburg v. Albertson's Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 ( 9 ' Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
See Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. 2162.
See id.
See id. at 2165.
See id.at2167-2169.
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
See id. at 2136.
See id.

104. Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a), (b)(6) (1998)).
105. See id.(citation omitted). See also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan.
1996). At the trial in the district court, testimony was received from Murphy's own physician and a medical expert
called by UPS. Id. Both testified that "Murphy's hypertension [did] not significantly restrict his activities and that
in general he can function normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do." Id.
106. See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 874.
107. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 96-3380, 1998 WL 105993, (10" Cir. 1998), affd, 119 S. Ct.
2133 (1999) (the 10' Circuit, in its unpublished opinion, held as it did in Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc., that
mitigating measures must be considered). See also supranote 88 and accompanying text.
108. SeeMurphy, 119 S.Ct. at2137.
109. See id. at 2139. See also supranote 90 and accompanying text.
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VI. MITIGATING MEASURES

Mitigating measures have been the subject of much litigation since the ADA
was signed into law by Congress in 1990." ' The question of mitigating measures
is an interesting one, and undoubtedly one that was in need of resolution.
Practically every Federal Court of Appeals has addressed the issue and, although
there was uniformity among the majority of the circuits, there were still widely
divergent rulings being handed down."1 ' As previously mentioned and explicated,
in June of 1999 the United States Supreme Court stepped in to establish a final
interpretation and construction of the ADA in the context of mitigating measures." 2
However, the effect of the Supreme Court's rulings in these three cases was to
significantly and wrongfully exclude millions of Americans from the sanctuary of
protection that Congress intended and designed the ADA provide.
The question that mitigating measures poses is, at first glance, relatively
simple -- should the effects of measures taken to correct for, or mitigate, an
individual's impairment be taken into account when assessing whether that
individual is substantially limited in amajor life activity and, hence, disabled within
the meaning of the ADA?" 3 Inherent within this question is the question -- who is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA? As simplistic as these definitions may
seem at first glance, when put within the broad and ambiguous language of the
ADA, confusion and disagreement can easily result, especially when an overly
active and intense analysis of Congress' implicit intent is undertaken. And a
lengthy interpretation of congressional intent is exactly what the United States
Supreme Court undertook in deciding these questions. However, the result reached
by the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court is contrary to a great weight
of persuasive authority that had previously undertaken the task of answering these
questions."

4

A. The U.S. Supreme Court'sDecision on MitigatingMeasures
The United States Supreme Court decided that mitigating measures must be
taken into consideration when determining if an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA." 5
Mitigating measures include artificial aids such as medicines and prosthetic
devices." 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that those things constituting

110. See
111. See
112. See
113. See
114. See
115. See
116. See

supranote 29.
id.
supra Part V.A-C.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146; Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2164; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
discussion infra Parts VII-IX.
supranote 113.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. AccordAlbertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
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mitigating measures do not stop merely at medicines and prosthetic devices." 17
Rather, the term mitigating measures includes compensating measures taken by the
individual and the body's own adaptive systems." 8 In Albertson's, the Supreme
Court stated that there is "no principled basis for distinguishing between measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures
undertaken, whether consciously or not with the body's own systems." 119 In
Albertson's, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's "brain [had]
developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment and
thus his body compensate[d] for his disability."' 2
The use or non-use of medications, prosthetic devices, and other ameliorative
measures is not, by itself, determinative of whether an individual is disabledwithin
the meaning of the ADA."' Even if an individual is undertaking some mitigating
measure, that individual may still qualify as disabled under "subsection A, if,
notwithstanding the use of a corrective... [measure], that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity." ' In assessing the effects of mitigating
measures undertaken by an individual to correct for or alleviate a physical or mental
impairment, the Court will examine not only the positive effects of such measures,
but also any negative side effects that occur.'13
B. The Majority'sJustificationVersus the Dissent'sReasoning
The majority of Justices of the United States Supreme Court justified their
mitigating measures determination on three separate ADA provisions.' 24 First, the
Court reasoned that because the ADA uses the phrase substantiallylimits" "in the
present indicative verb form.... the language is properly read as requiring that a
person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in
order to demonstrate a disability."'2 6 According to the majority, an individual who
can alleviate the effects of his/her disability through the use of medications or other
ameliorative measures does not suffer from a disability that substantially limits a
major life activity.127
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, expressly disagreed with the
majority's view in this respect, stating that "the statute's three-pronged definition
. . .makes it pellucidly clear that Congress intended the Act to cover such

117. See Albertson's at 2168-69 (determining that "Kirkingburg's 'brain has developed subconscious

mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment' ... such as 'adjustments to the manner in which he sensed
depth and perceived peripheral objects'...." (quoting Albertson's 143 F.3d 1232) (citations omitted)).
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2168. See also supranote 93 and accompanying text.
121. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149.
122. Id.

123. See id.
at 2146.
124. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146-48.
125. The phrase substantiallylimits appears in the first prong of the ADA's definition of disability. See supra
text accompanying notes 21, 51-53.
126. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2146.

127. See id. at 2146-47.
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persons." '28 "The three parts of [the ADA's] definition [of disability] do not

identify mutually exclusive, discrete categories. On the contrary, they furnish three
overlapping formulas aimed at ensuring that individuals who now have, or ever had,
a substantially limiting impairment are covered by the Act." 129 "The three prongs
...
are most plausibly read together not to inquire into whether a person is currently

"functionally" limited in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an
impairment - present or past - that substantially limits, or did so limit, the individual
before amelioration."' 30
The second provision cited by the majority in support of its ruling was that the
ADA explicitly requires that determining whether a person has a disability is an

individualized determination. 13t "The Act expresses that mandate clearly by
defining 'disability' 'with respect to an individual,' and in terms of the impact of
an impairment 'on such individual' ....,,132
Thus, "the determination of whether

an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of
the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life
of the individual."' 33
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens does not quarrel with the majority's
belief "that the letter and spirit of the ADA" requires an individualized determina34
tion of whether a person has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
However, Justice Stevens argues that the majority's position concerning the issue
of mitigating measures "actually condones treating individuals merely as members
of groups. ' 't: 5
Finally, the majority relied on the congressionalfindings,136 which they
claimed clearly indicate that "Congress did not intend to bring under the...

128. Id. at 2154 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 2153 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Justice Stevens provides an example of why the three-pronged
definition of disability in the ADA must be read as one formula:
There are many individuals who have lost one or more limbs in industrial accidents, or perhaps in the
service of their country ....With the aid of prostheses, coupled with courageous determination and
physical therapy, many of these hardy individuals can perform all of their major life activities just as
efficiently as an average couch potato. If the Act were just concerned with their present ability to
participate in society, many of these individuals' physical impairments would not be viewed as
disabilities. Similarly, if the statute were solely concerned with whether these individuals viewed
themselves as disabled - or with whether a majority of employers regarded them as unable to perform
mostjobs - many of these individuals would lack statutory protection from discrimination based on their
prostheses.
Id. at 2153-54 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
130. Id. at 2154 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
131. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) as authority for the proposition that
the ADA calls for an individualized determination of disability). AccordAlbertson's at 2169. See also 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app. background (1999) (stating that disability should be assessed on a case-by-case basis).
132. Albertson's,119 S. Ct. at 2169 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2147) (citations omitted).
133. Id. (citing Sutton at 2139).
134. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. In the factual context of Sutton,JusticeStevens argues that the majority's "misdirected approach permits
any employer to dismiss out of hand every person who has uncorrected eyesight worse than 20/100 without regard
to the specific qualifications of those individuals or the extent of their abilities to overcome their impairment." Id.
Justice Stevens then extends this analysis to factual situations involving a person with epilepsy or diabetes whose
illness is controlled with medication. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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[ADA's] protection all... [individuals] whose uncorrected conditions amount to
disabilities.' 37 According to the majority, if Congress had intended for the ADA's
coverage to extend to all individuals with uncorrected and corrected physical and

mental impairments, the number of disabled Americans in the congressional
findings would have been much higher than 43 million. 31 "That it did not is
evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted
to only those whose impairments are
39
not mitigated by corrective measures."

The dissent expressly rejects this argument, stating that the majority's
"tenacious grip on Congress' finding that 'some 43,000,000 Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities"' is a "'statement of congressional findings

that is a rather thin reed upon which to base a statutory construction."" 4 Furthermore, Justice Stevens argues that the 43 million figure was borrowed from a law
review article and was certainly not intended by Congress as a ceiling on the ADA's
intended protected class of individuals.' 4 '
VII. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' GUIDELINES
REGULATIONS

&

The Judiciary was not the first branch of government that undertook the task
of interpreting the ADA in the context of mitigating measures. Both the legislative
and executive branches have spoken on the issue as well. In Congress, both the

137. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2142. The 43,000,000 figure relied out by the majority as support for their position
is of questionable origin.
Although the exact source of the 43 million figure is not clear, the corresponding finding in the 1988
precursor to the ADA was drawn directly from a report prepared by the National Council of Disability.
That report detailed the difficulty of estimating the number of disabled persons due to varying
operational definitions of disability. It explained that the estimates of the number of disabled
Americans ranged from an overinclusive 160 million under a "health conditions approach," which looks
at all conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual, to an
underinclusive 22.7 million under a "work disability approach," which focuses on individual's reported
ability to work. It noted that "a figure of 35 or 36 million [was] the most commonly quoted estimate."
...Roughly two years after issuing its 1986 report, the National Council on Disability issued an
updated report. This 1988 report settled on a more concrete definition of disability. It stated that 37.3
million individuals have "difficulty performing one or more basic physical activities," including
"seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs, lifting or carrying, getting around outside, getting
around inside, and getting into or out of bed." The study from which it drew this data took an explicitly
functional approach to evaluating disabilities.
Id. at 2147-48 (quoting NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DisABmrUY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 10 (1986); ON TiE
THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE 19 (1988)) (citations omitted) (alterations in the original) (emphasis added).
138. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2149 (stating that the if Congress had intended the ADA to cover all of these
people that the number of disabled Americans cited in the congressional finding s would have easily exceeded 160
million.) See also NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VISION
RESEARCH-ANATIONALPLAN: 1999-2003 p.7 (1998) (more than 100 million Americans that suffer from vision
impairments); NATIONALINSTTUEs OFHEALTH, NATIONALSTRATEGIC RESEARCH PLAN: HEARING AND HEARING
IMPAIRMENT V (1996) (the number of Americans that have impaired hearing exceeds 28 million); TINDALL,
STALKING A SILENTKIU.LER: HYPERTENSION, BUSiNESS &HEALTH 37 (1998) (the number of Americans with high

blood pressure is approximately 50 million).
139. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
140. Id. at 2160 (Stevens, L,dissenting).
141. Id.
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Senate and House of Representatives addressed the question of mitigating measures
in various committee reports on the ADA.'42 Additionally, the EEOC, in
furtherance of its obligation to issue regulations to carry out the statutory mandates
of the ADA, has issued interpretive guidelines on mitigating measures. 43
Moreover, several executive agencies have delivered interpretations of the ADA
that provide an answer to the question of mitigating measures.'" All of these
reports and interpretations express uniform answers to the question of mitigating
measures, and all are completely contrary to the view elucidated by the45 United
States Supreme Court in the Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy decisions.
A. Legislative History
The recent interpretation and construction by the majority of the United States
Supreme Court t46 concerning the issue of mitigating measures was contrary to the
legislative interpretation and construction of the statute. "The [Senate and House]
Committee Reports on ... the ADA make it abundantly clear that Congress
intended the ADA to cover individuals who could perform all of their major life
activities only with the help of ameliorative measures."147 Indeed, all of the
Congressional Reports are "replete with references to the understanding that the
[ADA's] protected class includes individuals with various medical conditions
that
1 48
ordinarily are perfectly 'correctable' with medication or treatment."
149
The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
while specifically addressing the legislature's intent regarding thefirstprong5 ' of
the ADA, stated that "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."'' This Senate Committee also states that an important
objective of the thirdprong52 of the ADA is to "ensure that persons with medical
conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life
activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions." '53
For illustration, the Report explains that "individuals with controlled diabetes or
epilepsy are often denied jobs for which they are qualified" because of negative
attitudes and misinformation regarding their disabilities. 154
These two propositions initially appear to be contradictory. On the one hand,
the Report declares that mitigating measures should not be considered in determin-

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See discussion infra Part VILA.
See discussion infra Part VILB.1.
See discussion infra Part VILB.2.
See supranote 113.
See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139; Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. 2162; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See S. REt. No. 101-116 (1989).
See supratext accompanying note 22.
S. REP.No. 101-116, at23 (1989).
See supratext accompanying notes 25-26.
S. REP. No. 101-116, at24 (1989).
Id.
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ing if an individual is disabled.15 On the other hand, the Report indicates that if an
individual is capable of controlling a disability, such as diabetes or epilepsy, the
individual is not currently limited in a major life activity.5 6 However, these two
propositions, if viewed in concert and interpreted in the context of the primary
purpose5 7 of the ADA, are not contradictory but, rather, they are complementary.
It is conceivable that the Senate Committee is expressing a dual form of
protection. 5 Under thefirstprong,'5 9 individuals with disabilities such as diabetes
or epilepsy are protected under the ADA because they are disabled when viewed
without regard to mitigating measures. 60 In the alternative, these individuals are
protected under the thirdprongt ' against irrational and prejudicial opinions and
sentiments regarding their disabilities, even when their disabilities are under
62
control.
This interpretation is consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court
in School Board of Nassau County, Floridav. Arline, where the Supreme Court
concluded that the definition of a disabled individual includes "not only those
[individuals] who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded
' 6
as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity."'
The House of Representatives took a stance similar to that of the Senate
regarding the consideration of the effects of mitigating measures. For example, the
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary"64 states that "[t]he impairment
should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in aless-than-substantial
limitation."' 6 The House Committee Report exemplifies this by stating that an
individual with a hearing impairment is covered by the ADA, "even if the hearing
loss is corrected by the use of a hearing aid."' 66 As justification for this view, the
House Committee relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in School Board of
Nassau County, Floridav. Arline, where the Supreme Court stated that "[s]uch an
impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could

155. See supra text accompanying note 151.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
157. See supra text accompanying note 10.

158. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24 (1989); School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987). See also supratext accompanying notes 27-28.
159. See supra note 150.

160. See supra note 155.
161. See supra note 152.
162. See supra note 156.
163. 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987). This case deals specifically with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the
precursor to the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2198 (1998). Actually, much of the language of

the ADA was taken directly from the Rehabilitation Act. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989). For Example, the
Rehabilitation Act defined a handicappedindividualto be a person who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment

which substantially limits one or more of such persons major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment,
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). The ADA specifically requires that
"nothing in [the ADA] should be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).

164. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, p. M (1990).
165. Id. at 28.
166. Id. at 29.
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nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the
negative reactions of others to the impairment."' 67 This reasoning is in line with
Congress' acknowledgment that "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from [the] actual impairment."' 8
The House Committee on Education and Labor169 went even further in
expressing Congress' intent to exclude mitigating measures from consideration
when determining whether an individual is disabled with the meaning the ADA.
This House Report explicitly states that an individual will still be protected under
thefirst prong7 ' of the disability definition even if the effects of the disability are
ameliorated by mitigating measures.'
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be
corrected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments,
such as epilepsy or diabetes,which substantiallylimit a major life activity are
covered under the firstprong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of
the impairmentare controlledby medication.'72
It is clear from the House and Senate Reports explicated above that the
widespread Congressional view, at the time of the ADA's enactment, was that
mitigating measures should not be considered when determining if an individual
falls within the ADA's protected class. Yet, the United States Supreme Court found
it to be Congress' intent that mitigating measures be considered in determining
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity and, hence,
disabled within the meaning of the ADA."7 ' The majority of the Supreme Court
either chose to ignore the Reports of Congress or put more weight on the congressional finding that 43,000,000 Americans are disabled. 74
B. Executive Agencies' InterpretationofADA
The Senate and House are not the only governmental bodies to interpret the
ADA as excluding consideration of mitigating measures when determining if an
individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In addition, "each of the
three Executive agencies charged with implementing the Act has consistently

167. 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987). See also supra note 163.
168. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989); S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, p. 11, at

53 (1990).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

H.R. REP. No. 101-485, Pt. 11 (1990).
See supra note 150.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at52 (1990).
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 113, 146.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
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interpreted the Act as mandating that the presence of disability turns on an
individual's uncorrected state." 175 The interpretations by the EEOC, Department
of Justice, and Department of Transportation are in unison with the interpretations
176
embraced in the Senate and House of Representatives Committee Reports
concerning the issue of mitigating measures, and consequently, are17 in
complete
7
opposition to the view adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
1. The EEOC's Answer to the Question of Mitigating Measures
179
The EEOC 178 has promulgated many regulations interpreting the ADA.
These interpretations "are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 8° "[A] court may not substitute
its own 1construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable [agency] interpreta18
tion.'
In multiple instances, the EEOC has held that "[t]he determination of whether
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case
by case basis, without regardto mitigatingmeasuressuch as medicines, orassistive
or prostheticdevices."' 2 The EEOC reiterates this same point stating that "[t]he
existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."' 83 This principle
is exemplified by the following illustrations:

An individual who uses artificial legs would... be substantially limited in the
major life activity of walking because the individual is unable to walk without the
aid of prosthetic devices. Similarly, a diabetic who without insulin would lapse
into a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform
major life activities without the aid of medication."8
The EEOC maintained its view on the issue of mitigating measures when it

175. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("executive agencies" refers to the EEOC, Department of
Justice, and Department of Transportation).
176. See supraPart VILA.
177. See supra note 173.
178. Congress authorized the EEOC to issue regulations to enforce and carry out the statutory mandates of the
ADA. See supra text accompanying note 37.
179. Congress authorized the EEOC to issue regulations to carry out the statutory mandates of the ADA. See
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1990). See also supratext accompanying notes 30-36 (discussing the persuasive force of these
regulations).
180. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (citations

omitted).
181. Id.
182. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999) (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 1630.2(h) (citing S. REt'. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. RPP. No. 101-485, pt. 1/, at 52 (1990); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 28 (1990)).
184. Id. § 1630.20) (citing S. REP. No 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990)).
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stated in its amicus curiae brief1 85 to the United States Supreme Court in the Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc." 6 case that "the question whether an individual has a
disability under the ADA must be answered without regard to mitigating measures
that the individual takes to ameliorate the effects of the impairment." ' 7 In the
context of the factual circumstances of Sutton, the EEOC stated that "there is
nothing8 about poor vision that would justify adopting a different rule in this
case."

18

2. The Department of Justice and Department of Transportation
This uniformity of views on excluding mitigating measures from consideration when determining whether an individual is disabled does not end with the
Senate, House of Representatives, and EEOC. Additionally, the Department of
Justice1 89 and the Department of Transportation190 have adopted identical views on
mitigating measures in their respective regulations.
The Department of Justice has stated in its regulations that "[tihe question of
whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary
aids and services."'1 91 The Department of Transportation issued a regulation
identical to that of the Department of Justice.1 92 The regulations also provide the
following familiar examples:
[A] person with a hearing loss is substantially limited in the major life activity of
hearing, even though the hearing loss may be improved through the use of a
hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes,
that substantially limit a major life activity, are covered under the first prong of
the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication.

185. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Sutton v. United AirLines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943) (the"United States"
stated in the Brief designation refers to the Department of Juttice).
186. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
187. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 6, Sutton (No 97-1943). Numerous other organizations and individuals submitted Amicus
Curiae Briefs in support of this same proposition. See discussion infra Part VIEI

188.
189. The Department of Justice has been granted authority by Congress to implement regulations applicable to
all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by public entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)

(1994).
190. The Department of Transportation has been granted authority by Congress to implement regulations to carry
out the transportation related provisions of Title Uland III of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149(a), 12186(a)(1)

(1994). See also 49 C.F.R. § 37.1 (1999).
191. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.104 (1999)
192. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1999).
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VIII. PERSUASIVE OPINIONS - AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS
The Supreme Court's decisions in the Sutton,'93 Albertson's, 94 and Murphy' 95

cases were of great interest to numerous organizations and individuals, which was
evidenced by the submission of over twenty amicus curiae briefs between the three
cases. Although there were numerous amicus briefs submitted that opined a view
requiring the consideration of mitigating measures,'9 6 the majority of the amicus
briefs supported the exclusion of mitigating measures as a consideration when
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
The amicus curiae briefs supporting exclusion of mitigating measures were
submitted by highly respected and distinguished organizations and individuals.'9 7
Although amicus briefs do not carry the weight of legal authority,' these briefs
present highly persuasive opinions because of the esteem with which the proponents
are held.' 99
A few of the organizations submitting amicus briefs that supported the
exclusion of mitigating measures as a consideration in determining whether an
individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA include: The Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), "° The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU),2"' The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO),2 °" AIDS Action," 3 The National Employment Lawyers

193. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
194. 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
195. 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999).
196. Among the distinguished organizations that submitted amicus briefs supporting the consideration of
mitigating measures were: The Society for Human Resource Management, the Labor Policy Association, the Air
Transport Association of America, The Equal Employment Advisory Council, the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, and the Michigan Manufacturers Association. Not surprisingly, all of these
organizations represent employers.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 200-05.
198. Amicus curiae briefs are merely briefs submitted by 'Triends of the court" who hold a "strong interest in
or views on the subject matter of [the] action ....
ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale
consistent with its own views." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 82 (6"' ed. 1990).
199. See infra notes 202-04,217-22 and accompanying text.
200. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943) (the "United States"
stated in the Briefs designation refers to the Department of Justice).
201. See Brief Amicus Curiae ofThe American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioners, Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943).
202. See Brief of The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amidi Curiae
in Support of the Petitioners, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943). "The
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) [is] a federation of 75 national
and international unions with a total membership of approximately 13,000,000 working men and women..." Id.
at 1.
203. Brief of AIDS Action, etal., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Sutton and Murphy, Sutton v. United
AirLines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999)
(No. 98-1992) (the "et al." refers to over 25 organizations joining as amici curiae). "The amici curiae joining this
brief are organizations that represent individuals with disabilities, including individuals with disabilities that are
ameliorated or treated with mitigating measures such as medications." Id. at 1.
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Association (NELA),2° as well as a brief submitted by Senators Harkin and
Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and Owens, and Former Senator Dole. 0 5
Following are some short excerpts from several of these amicus briefs to illustrate
the positions taken, as well as several unique arguments supporting their positions.
The EEOC 2 6 states that mitigating measures should not be considered when
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 0 7
Congress's intent in this regard is set forth with unusual clarity in... relevant
committee reports. ... [A]ssessing the existence of a disability without regard
to mitigating measures is most consistent with the ADA's basic purpose .... To
take mitigating measures into account... would distort the analysis required
under the scheme that Congress enacted.208
The ACLU stated that mitigating measures should not be considered when
determining whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because "the ADA was intended to broadly protect qualified persons with physical
and mental impairments from discrimination in employment."2' 9
The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) also championed the
position of excluding mitigating measures from consideration, relying upon
arguments and rationale identical to those enunciated by the EEOC and ACLU.2 1°
Additionally, the NELA put forth a unique public policy argument for excluding
mitigating measures.21 ' Relying primarily upon the First Circuit's rationale in
Arnold v. United ParcelService, Inc.,21 2 the NELA argues that "[t]he ADA should
not be interpreted in a manner that would discourage individuals from attempting
to control their impairments. 2 3
[A person] should not be denied the protections of the ADA because he has

204. See BriefAmicus Curiae ofthe National EmploymentLawyers Association in Support ofPetitioners, Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943). "The National Lawyers Association (NELA) is
a voluntary membership organization of over 3,000 lawyers who regularly represent employees in labor,

employment, and civil rights disputes." Id. at 1. NELA has "represented thousands of individuals in this country
who are victims of employment discrimination based on disability status." Id. at 2.
205. See Brief of Senators Harldn and Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and Owens and Former Senator Dole
as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent Kirkingburg and Petitioners Sutton and Murphy, Albertson's Inc. v.

Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (No. 97-1943, 97-1992, 98-591).
206. See supraPart IIB.
207. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 6, Sutton (No. 97-1943)

208. Id. at 7-8.
209. BriefAmicus Curiae ofThe American Civil Liberties Union in Support of the Petitioners at 12, Sutton (No.

97-1943).
210. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners at 6,
Sutton (No. 97-1943).

211. See id. at 17-19.
212. 136 F.3d 854 (1-s Cir. 1998).
213. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioner Sutton at

17, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
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independently taken the initiative and successfully brought his [disability] under
control. It is hard to imagine that Congress wished to provide protection to
workers who leave it to their employer to accommodate their impairments but to
deny protection to workers who act independently to overcome their disabilities,
thereby creating a disincentive to self help.214
The NELA also cites decisions by the Eighth Circuit in Doane v. City of Omaha21
and the Second Circuit in Bartlettv. New York State Board ofLaw Examiners216 in

support of this argument.
The amicus brief filed by Senators Harkin2 17 and Kennedy,2 1 8 Representatives

Hoyer 219 and Owens,"2 and former Senator Dole

22'

also supports the position of

excluding mitigating measures from consideration.222 These distinguished
"Senators and Congressmen were primary authors and sponsors of the Americans

with Disabilities Act and have been leaders in shaping this nation's disability
policy." 2" These Congressmen explicitly state that Congress intended the ADA's

definition of disability in the first prong to be "determined without consideration of
mitigating measures.""
The plain language of the statute simply looks at whether the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity. Requiring a court to look at the
impairment in its mitigated state... would undermine the purpose of the first
prong, which is to prohibit discrimination on the basis of the impairment itself.2"

214. Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 863 n.7 (I' Cir. 1998).
215. 115 F.3d 624 (8t" Cir. 1997) (holding that even though Doane's brain had developed subconscious ways
to mitigate the effects of his blindness in one eye, he was still disabled under the first prong because mitigating
measures should not be considered).
216. 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that despite Bartlett's self-accommodations to overcome her learning
disability, she was still protected under the first prong of the ADA).
217. Senator Tom Harkin "was the chief sponsor and a principal author of the ADA. As Chair of the
Subcommittee on Disability Policy of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and floor manager,
he was involved in all aspects of the passage of the ADA." Brief of Senators Harkin and Kennedy, Representatives
Hoyer and Owens and Former Senator Dole as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent Kirkingburg and Petitioners
Sutton and Murphy at 1, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
218. Senator Edward Kennedy, "a principal author of the ADA, was the Chair of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources during its passage." Id.
219. Congressman Steny Hoyer "was the lead House co-sponsor of the ADA. He led the House passage of the
legislation and was intimately involved in all aspects of its consideration." Id.
220. Congressman Major Owens "was Chair of the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee of
Education and Labor during the deliberations on the ADA and was involved in all deliberations in the House." Id.
221. Former Senator Bob Dole, "a war veteran with a disability, was a key proponent of securing equal
opportunity for people with disabilities during his years in the Senate, including playing a leadership role in the
development of the ADA." Id.
222. See Brief of Senators Harkin and Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and Owens and Former Senator Dole
as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent Kirkingburg and Petitioners Sutton and Murphy at 9, Sutton (No. 98591).
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 9. Considering the distinguished Congressmen's involvement in the sponsorship and drafting of the
ADA, one could argue, albeit unsuccessfully due to the medium of transmission, that these statements constitute
highly persuasive authority.
225. Id. at 10.
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All of the amicus briefs recommending the exclusion of mitigating measures
from consideration are replete with arguments identical to those in the above
excerpts. This great weight of persuasive opinions is further evidence that the
United States Supreme Court's rulings in the Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy
decisions... incorrectly interpreted the ADA in the context of mitigating measures.

IX. DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

The question of whether to consider mitigating measures has been addressed
and answered by the majority227 of the Federal Courts of Appeals within the last
four years. 22s The vast majority229 of the Federal Courts of Appeals decided the
issue in conformity with the views embraced in the legislative history2 30 and by the
EEOC, 23 Department of Justice, and Department of Transportation.232
A. The Vast Majority of the Circuit Courts
The First Circuit considered the question of mitigating measures in Arnold v.
UnitedParcelService, Inc., 3 which involved a individual with diabetes who was
denied employment on the grounds that the position required him to have a license
to operate commercial motor vehicles, and Arnold could not obtain the license
because the Department of Transportation precludes insulin-dependent diabetics
from obtaining such certification." Arnold sued alleging that UPS discriminated
against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the ADA. 235 Relying upon
the legislative history3 6 and the EEOC's regulations,237 the First Circuit held that
Arnold was disabled within the meaning of the ADA because the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures should not be considered when determining whether
an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.238
In Bartlettv. New York State Board of Law Examiners,239 the Second Circuit
examined the issue of mitigating measures. Dr. Bartlett suffered from a reading

226. See supra notes 193-95.
227. All of the Federal Courts of Appeals except the Fourth Circuit and the Circuit for the District of Columbia
have considered the issue of mitigating measures.
228. See supranote 29.
229. Eight out of ten of the Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue have determined that disability status
should always be determined without regard to mitigating measures. See supra Part IX.A.
230. See supraPart VILA.
231. See supraPart VILB.1.
232. See supraPart VILB.2.
233. 136 F.3d 854 (1- Cir. 1998).
234. See id. at 856-57. See also 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (1999) (Department of Transportation regulation).
235. See id. at 857.
236. See supranote 230.
237. See supranote 231.
238. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 866.
239. 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999).
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disorder that caused her to read significantly slower than the average person."4
However, she had developed self accommodations24' that allowed her read better
than the typical person with a reading disability.242 After graduating from Vermont
School of Law, Dr. Bartlett attempted to pass the New York State Bar Exam five
times. 3 She had applied several times to be considered as a reading disabled
candidate so that she could take the bar examination with accommodations, but the
Board of Law Examiners rejected her application for reading disabled status each
time.'
Dr. Bartlett brought suit alleging violations of the ADA. The Second
Circuit held that Dr. Bartlett was disabled within the meaning of the ADA
irrespective of her self accommodationsbecause mitigating measures are not to be
considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited within
a major life activity. 4
The Third Circuit, in Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co.,246
looked at the issue of mitigating measures, which involved an individual with
epilepsy who was fired from his job less than six months after having an epileptic
seizure at work. 7 Matczak controlled his epilepsy with medication and had not
had a seizure episode for nearly 30 years.248 Matczak sued alleging that his
employer fired him because he had epilepsy.24 9 The Third Circuit held that Matczak
could be considered disabled under the ADA because "disabled individuals who
control their disability [sic] with medication may still invoke the protections of the
ADA." 0
In Gildayv. Mecosta County," which involved an individual with non-insulin
dependent diabetes, for which he took oral medication and maintained a strict
diet,25 2 the Sixth Circuit considered the question of mitigating measures. Gilday
was terminated for rude conduct 5 3 He alleged that his termination would not have
occurred if his employer had honored his request for accommodations.254 Gilday
had requested that he be reassigned to a position that was less chaotic because stress
aggravated his disease5 5 The Sixth Circuit determined that Gilday was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA because "the existence of a mitigating measure
' 6
should not be taken into account when deciding whether a disability exists."

240. See id.
at 329.
241. Dr. Bartlett developed her self accommodations while teaching phonics as a schoolteacher.
242. See Bartlett,156 F.3d at 326.

243. See id. at 324.
244. See id. Dr. Bartlett wanted accommodations that would allow her "unlimited or extended time to take the
test, permission to tape record her essays and to circle her multiple choice answers in the test booklet." Id.

245. See id. at 329.
246. 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).

247.
248.
249.
250.

See id. at 935.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 937.

251. 124 F.3d 760 (6h Cir.1997).

252. See id.
at 761.
253. See id.

254. See ilL
255. See id.
256. Id. at 765 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
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In Baert v. Euclid Beverages, Ltd..257 which involved an individual with
insulin-dependent diabetes,2 8 the Seventh Circuit considered the question of
mitigating measures. Baert was diagnosed with diabetes while he was working as
a truck driver for Euclid Beverages. 9 After being diagnosed, he was no longer able
to drive the commercial trucks because of Department of Transportation regulations. 260 Euclid Beverages offered him a transfer to a position that paid substantially less than the truck driving position.2 1 Baert sued alleging violations of the
ADA. 262 The Seventh Circuit held that Baert was disabled for purposes of the ADA
because "whether a condition constitutes an impairment, and the extent to which the
impairment limits an individual's major life activities [should be assessed] without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices. 263
The Eighth Circuit examined mitigating measures in Doane v. City of
Omaha,2 6 which involved a police officer who lost vision in one eye because of
glaucoma.265 He continued to work for seven years.266 Seven years later, the City
of Omaha told him that he could no longer work as a police officer because of his
condition, relying upon a job requirement that police officers be able to see out of
both eyes.267 The Eighth Circuit held that Doane was covered by the ADA despite
the fact that his brain had developed subconscious adjustments to compensate for
his monocular vision.26S
In Holihanv. Lucky Stores, Inc.,269 which involved an individual who suffered
from several psychological problems that, allegedly, caused him to behave
abusively toward subordinates at the grocery store he managed,27 the Ninth Circuit
looked at mitigating measures. The Ninth Circuit considered Holihan in an
unmitigatedstate and determined that he was not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA because he was not substantially limited in a major life activity.27 The Ninth
Circuit also considered mitigating measures in Kirkingburg v. Albertson's Inc.,272
where it held that Kirkingburg's subconscious adjustments to his monocular vision
should not be considered, and he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.273

257. 149 F.3d 626 (7a Cir. 1998).
258. See id. at 628.
259. See id.
260. See id. See also 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (1999) (Department of Transportation regulation).
261. See Baert, 149 F.3d at 628.

262. See id.
263. Baert, 149 F.3d at 629 (citing Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital, 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7" Cir. 1995);
Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1' Cir. 1998)).
264. 115 F.3d 624 (8h Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 693 (1998).
265. See id. at 625.

266. See id.
267. See id. at 625-26.

268. See id. at 627-28.
269. 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 1349 (1997).
270. See id.at 364.

271. See HE at 366.
272. 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
273. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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The Eleventh Circuit examined mitigating measures in Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co.,274 which involved an individual with Graves' disease that was
being controlled by medication. 5 Harris experienced a panic attack and was
hospitalized due to an accidental overdose of her medication. 6 While Harris was
on sick leave, the employer hired a person to replace her.277 Shortly after returning
to work, she was told that she would need to seek employment elsewhere once she
was feeling better. 78 Harris sued claiming she was discriminated against in
violation of the ADA. 9 The Eleventh Circuit determined that Harris was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA because "there is nothing illogical about determining the existence of a substantial limitation without regard to mitigating measures
... and there is nothing in the language of the statute itself that rules out that
0
approach. ,28
B. The Fifth Circuit:A UniqueApproach
The Fifth Circuit examined the issue of mitigating measures in Washington v.
HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc..281 In Washington, the plaintiff suffered from
"Adult Stills Disease, a degenerative rheumatoid condition affecting his bones and
joints."" Washington was able to control his disease through the use of medication. 83 Without the medication, he would have been bedridden and unable to
work. 4 The demands of his job were intensifying, and Washington collapsed at
work.2 5 His doctor recommended that he reduce his working hours, and he asked
his employer to accommodate his need for a lighter schedule. 286 Shortly thereafter,
Washington was terminated from his job, and he sued alleging that he was
terminated in violation of the ADA 7
The Fifth Circuit took a unique approach to the issue of mitigating measures.
The c6urt acknowledged that the legislative history contained in the congressional
reports and the EEOC's regulations called for the exclusion of mitigating measures
when determining disability status under the ADA.288 However, the Fifth Circuit
refused to "make a broad pronouncement that all impairments must be considered
in their unmitigated state." '89 Rather, the court gave a narrower interpretation,
reasoning that only some impairments and ailments "fall within the scope of the
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

102 F.3d 516 (llth Cir. 1996).
See id. at 517.
See id. at 518.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Harris, 102F.3d at521.
152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
Id. at 466.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Washington, 152 F.3d at 466.
See id. at 469.
Id. at471.
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EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history.""29 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
"whether an individual must be evaluated without regard to mitigating measures
depends on both the nature of the impairment and the mitigating measures employed
by the individual."29 1 The Fifth Circuit believed that only serious impairments and
ailments were to be considered in an unmitigated state.292 Moreover, the court
determined that the mitigating measures must be employed on a frequent,
continuous, and recurring basis in order to be excluded from consideration.293
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit maintained "if the mitigating measures amount to
permanent corrections or ameliorations, then they may be taken into
consideration."294
If an individual has a permanent correction or amelioration, such as an artificial
joint or a pin or a transplanted organ, that individual must be evaluated in his
mitigated state and cannot claim that he is disabled because he would be
"substantially limited in a major life activity" if he had not had his hip joint
replaced. 295
In light of the principles enunciated above, the Fifth Circuit held that
Washington's disease was the type of ailment that should be evaluated without
regard to mitigating measures because it was a serious disease that required him to
take medication every day.296
C. The Tenth Circuit:All Alone

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.297 and Murphy v. United ParcelService,
Inc.,298 the Tenth Circuit considered the issue of mitigating measures. As previously
mentioned, the Tenth Circuit held, in both of these cases, that mitigating measures
must be considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the ADA.299
In sum, it is more than apparent that the United States Supreme Court's rulings
in the Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy cases" were contrary to a great weight of
persuasive authority from the Federal Courts of Appeals.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 470.
See Washington, 152 F.2d at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471 (citing Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1996).
See id.
130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), affid, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), affd, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
See supratext accompanying notes 106-08.
See supranote 226.
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X. CONCLUSION

The Americans with Disabilities Act was drafted and enacted to protect the

civil rights of disabled Americans.30 1 Congress intended and designed the ADA to
be construed broadly so as to effectuate the purposes of the Act.3" The recent
rulings by the United States Supreme Court 3 addressing the question of mitigating
measures had the opposite effect, resulting in a curtailment of the scope of the

ADA's coverage. The consequence of these decisions is to exclude from the
ADA's coverage individuals whom Congress undoubtedly intended and designed
the Act to protect.

For illustration, consider an individual with diabetes mellitus, type I.

With

the aid of daily injections of insulin, 30 5 a mitigatingmeasure, 316 this individual is not

substantially limited30 7 in a major life activity.308 Such an individual functions as
normally as any other person with the insulin injections. 3'

However, in an

unmedicated state, this individual would, in a relatively short period of time, lapse
into a diabetic coma," 0 and without medical intervention, certainly die3

Therefore, if evaluated in an unmedicated state this individual is substantially

limited in the major life activity of producing insulin3 " and hence, disabled within
the meaning of the ADA. Conversely, if evaluated in a medicated state, the

methodology advocated by the Supreme Court,3 13 this individual is not substantially

301. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
302. See supra text accompanying note 11.
303. Supranote 146.
304. Type I diabetes occurs when an individual's "immune system mistakenly destroys the insulin-producing
beta cells in the pancreas, treating them as if they were a foreign invader." AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION,
COMPLEEGuiDETODIABETES 15(1996). As a result, the individual's body ceases the production of insulin. See
id. at 36. The onset of type I is typically from childhood to teenage years, which is one characteristic that
distinguishes it from type IL which is usually diagnosed in overweight individuals over the age of 40. See id. at
12. With Type i diabetes, the individual's body is still producing insulin, but the insulin is not being used properly
by the body. See id. at 22. See also supra text accompanying note 50 (Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources including diabetes in a list of specific diseases and aliments that it considered to be a physical
impairment constituting a disability within the meaning of the ADA).
305. Insulin is a hormone that helps cells use glucose by allowing glucose to enter cells and be used as energy.
See AmraucAN DIABEmS ASSOCIATION, COMPL=E GUIDE TO DIABETES 94 (1996). Cells must have energy to
survive and grow. See id. at 139. A type I diabetic individual must give himself/herself regular insulin injections.
See id. at 36.
306. See supratext accompanying note 116 (referring to medications as mitigating measures).
307. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
308. After having lived the majority of my life with a brother who has successfully and courageously coped with
diabetes, the last thing I would call him is substantially limited in a major life activity.
309. It must be conceded that there are occasional ups-and-downs, even for a well controlled diabetic condition.
Several factors other than insulin injections affects glucose distribution to the cells, including: diet, exercise, stress,
and illness. See AMERCAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, COMPLETE GuIDE TO DIABETES 138-43.
310. When the body's cells are not getting enough glucose, a hypoglycemic reaction will occur. See id. at 158.
If not treated immediately with insulin, the individual will lapse into a coma. See id. at 164.
311. An individual with type I diabetes is dependent upon injected insulin to stay alive. See id. at 139.
312. See supratext accompanying note 54 (discussion of major life activities). Although not specifically listed
as a major life activity by the EEOC, considering the fact that insulin production is necessary to stay alive, it is
more than reasonable to say that the body's production of insulin is a major life activity.
313. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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limited in any major life activity because the daily insulin injections mitigate the
effects of the disease. 14 Is it not apparent from this illustration alone that
something is wrong with the Supreme Court's rulings?" 5 Did Congress really
intend and design the ADA so that an individual, who, in an unmedicated state will
lapse into a coma and potentially die from a serious chronic disease, could easily
be found non-disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he/she undertakes
measures necessary to keep himself/herself alive.
The immediate question that seems pressing is why did seven Justices of the
United States Supreme Court decide that the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures must be considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity and, hence, disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. Obviously, the majority did not rely on the legislative history or administrative guidelines and regulations, nor did it lend credence to the persuasive voice of
eight Federal Courts of Appeals. Moreover, the majority ignored the recommendations of several of the distinguished Congressmen involved in the creation and
authoring of the ADA.
The Supreme Court's majority wanted to achieve this result before ever
selecting the cases to effect the result. The cases that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the issue of mitigating measures were factually easy to justify
the result. Of course it seems sensible to require the consideration of eye glasses
or contact lenses when determining whether an individual with poor vision is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. To do otherwise, would open the doors
of the ADA's coverage to every person who has imperfect vision. In this regard, it
must be conceded that the majority's rulings on mitigating measures were not
wholly incorrect and unjustifiable, for it is doubtful that when Congress drafted the
ADA it intended to render individuals with mere visual acuity impairments as
disabled. However, if the factual situation had dealt with an individual suffering
from diabetes or epilepsy, the majority's position would have been much more
difficult to justify, as the diabetes example above illustrates.
In light of the massive amount of persuasive authority that the Supreme
Court's majority sided against, one must wonder if the rulings in these cases were
an attempt to set a lower limit on the ADA's coverage, or perhaps a measure taken
to induce Congress to amend the ADA and clarify the overly ambiguous language
of the Act. In any event, it would be a far stretch to proclaim that the issue has been
decided once and for all. Differing factual situations will require a different result,
a clarification of the law, or an exception to be made. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated, they "sit to decide concrete cases and not abstract propositions of
3 16
law.

Whatever the underlying reason for the majority's decisions, the congressional
purpose and intent of the ADA is not being achieved. This is obvious from the
legislative history alone, without even considering agency guidelines and

314. See supranotes 304-08.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
316. UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 386 (1981).
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regulations. The Supreme Court's decisions were at a minimum overly broad, and
at a maximum entirely incorrect.
At the present time, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington v. HCA Health
Services of Texas, Inc. 317 appears to be the most amicable and rational solution to
the problem of mitigating measures. 31" A distinction between impairments of a
serious nature that must be continuously controlled through the use of mitigating
measures and minor impairments or impairments that are corrected through a final
measure would serve to protect those individuals whom Congress intended the ADA
to cover while excluding individuals who are not substantially limited in a major
life activity and, hence, not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Eric D. Wade

317. See 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
318. See discussion supraPart IX.B.
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